not necessarily use or (as noted above) understand this information. As one Youth Justice practitioner (‘Other’ team outside of Childrens Services) outlines: “I vaguely remember we talked about it in a team meeting a long, long, long time ago and about these models and how, it would work. I haven't used it myself and I think it was used for when we first had a [specific Early Intervention team] looking at exploitation. We're not a re-assist service that can work with anyone. So it's kind of less relevant in a way because our cohort is our cohort and we don't have any choice.” Furthermore, some practitioners felt uncomfortable about this level of access to risk scoring information: “The ethical questions need to be covered. I don’t know how. It’s lots of people – it’s a big organisation – can just press a button and see all this information about people.” (Early Intervention Practitioner) Similarly to the TFD, whilst we found no evidence of harm being caused, instances where practitioners have access to data that goes beyond the scope of their roles potentially represents an unmanaged risk. It is worth noting at this point, that this evaluation contains an assessment Bristol’s approach to Information Governance (p.68). In this, we make clear that we don’t feel as though there is an data access control issue that mean principles of GDPR haven’t been applied in a robust way, but that there may be scope to take a more specific approach to the application of these principles, for example, by understanding data requirements on a team-by-team basis. Some practitioners also raised concerns about potential biases embedded in the CCE and CSE predictive models Practitioners highlighted that since the exploitation models were reliant on existing Police data, biases embedded within 